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Science and technology play a central role in the contemporary governance of security, both as 
tools for the production of security and as objects of security concern. Scholars are increasingly 
seeking to not only critically reflect on the interplays between science, technology and security, 
but also engage with the practices of security communities that shape and are shaped by science 
and technology. To further help this growth of interest in security topics within science and 
technology studies (STS), we explore possible modes of socio-technical collaboration with security 
communities of practice. Bringing together literatures from STS and critical security studies, we 
identify several key challenges to critical social engagement of STS scholars in security-related 
issues. We then demonstrate how these challenges played out over the course of three case 
studies from our own experience in engaging security communities of practice. We use these 
vignettes to show that there is a rich vein of developments in both theory and practice that STS 
scholars can pursue by attending to the interplay of science, technology and security.
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Introduction
In the early winter of 2001, Wiebe Bijker got on stage at the Society for the Social 
Studies of Science Annual Meeting in Cambridge, Massachusetts to deliver his Pre-
Presidential Address. He began with a call to engagement, stating that ‘STS is not only 
crucial for understanding our technological cultures; it is equally important for develop-
ing democratic politics’ (Bijker, 2003: 443). What spurred Bijker to make this comment 
were the terrorist attacks on the US, which made use not of the latest weapons systems, 
but of box cutters, airplanes and letters. His concern was that such a shaking of a heavily 
technological culture with the most mundane of technologies might lead to political 
agendas that would capitalize on security concerns to diminish democratic capabilities 
around the world. STS, he argued, needs to ‘actively contribute to democratizing this 
technological culture: to show to a broad array of audiences – politicians, engineers, 
scientists, and the general public – that science and technology are value laden, that all 
aspects of modern culture are infused with science and technology, that science and tech-
nology do play key roles in keeping society together, and that they are equally central in 
all events that threaten its stability’ (Bijker, 2003: 444).
Of course, STS researchers have been actively contributing to democratizing techno-
logical cultures for some time (Ravetz, 1971; Sismondo, 2008), but the last 20 years have 
seen a significant uptick in those of us who see ourselves as doing STS ‘in the world’, 
making and remaking sociotechnical systems based on – and furthering – insights from 
over half a century of analysis. These efforts of engaged STS span a breathtaking range 
of issue areas, from Dutch policy engagement to Brazilian mosquito control to Japanese 
disaster recovery. Curiously, interest in what might be called the security sphere has only 
received low-level, if fairly constant, attention (Vogel et al., 2017), despite Bijker bring-
ing up this specific topic because of the September 11th, 2001 attacks.
STS scholarship tends to love a hard case, which acts as a grindstone upon which we 
can hone our analytic capabilities and advance our theories. The choice of analyzing sci-
ence was itself characterized as a turn to a hard case in the early days of STS (Bloor, 
1976), because of its claim to be the guardian of truth in society and the progenitor of 
benefits (Woolgar, 2004). But whereas many of these cases have focused on the ways of 
ordering knowledge systems, we need to put equal weight on cases that order social and 
political systems. While hard cases around science, technology and the law have looked 
at the ways that societies order internal to themselves (e.g. Jasanoff, 2011), looking at 
security as a hard case is about the ways that threats to those social orders are con-
structed, by whom and the role of technoscience in doing so.
Luckily, STS has a closely aligned field in this hard case. ‘Critical security studies’ 
has been analyzing the pivotal societal role of security for a good thirty years now 
(Booth, 1991; Krause and Williams 1997). It has seen a similar increase in interest in 
‘assisting security practitioners in becoming more reflexive about their practices, as well 
as in helping them to cope with multiple truths, theories and technical knowledge’ 
(c.a.s.e. collective, 2006: 474). STS can benefit from the decades of research within criti-
cal security studies on how discourses of security hold so much power within societies. 
While critical security studies has already started to incorporate STS work more system-
atically in order to analyze the ways that power structures are embedded within and 
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reproduced through science and technology (Bourne, 2014; Hoijtink and Leese, 2019; 
Mayer et al., 2014; Salter, 2015), STS has, with a few notable exceptions (e.g. Masco, 
2014; Rappert, 2009; Suchman et al., 2017), been more hesitant when it comes to the 
analysis of technoscientific security practices. We contend that the fields can benefit 
each other when it comes to the question of how to put an engaged program into practice 
vis-à-vis powerful security frames.
In this article, we consider possible modes of engagement with technoscientific secu-
rity contexts. We believe that a meaningful entry into this hard case is through a method-
ology that considers the relationality of the STS/critical security studies researcher to her 
or his community of practice. We analyze how STS approaches to engagement are com-
plicated by communities of practice where security is an active discourse and frame. We 
use three vignettes from our own research to illustrate how productive analysis can be 
achieved across a range of types of socio-technical collaboration, and conclude with 
thoughts on future directions for coupling STS and critical security studies together. By 
studying how we have attempted to study, and therein shape, discourses and practices 
around science, technology and security, we are able to see the forces at work in opening 
up and closing down what kinds of analysis are even allowable.
Socio-technical collaboration and security
The creation and application of scientific knowledge plays an important role in how 
societies aspire to maintain order and civility (Shapin, 1995). The production, stabiliza-
tion and diffusion of scientific and technical orders are closely entangled with, and mutu-
ally constitutive of, the production of social order (Jasanoff, 1996, 2004). Technoscientific 
enterprises are coined by specific cultural and political imaginaries that they in turn help 
to realize (Jasanoff and Kim, 2009, 2015), and STS has a rich history of engaging with 
the politics of co-production (Jasanoff, 1990; Miller and Wyborn, 2018; Polanyi, 1962; 
Shapin and Schaffer, 1985). Notably, it has also sparked a reconsideration of the role that 
the social sciences should occupy within this constellation.
Loosely gathered under the term ‘socio-technical collaboration’ (Fisher et al., 2015), 
a broad body of literatures engages with ways we as scholars can work with communities 
we research in the production of problems, relevant knowledges and innovations (Balmer 
et al., 2015: 8; Downey and Zuiderent-Jerak, 2017). These literatures are not homogene-
ous, but consist of a variety of different approaches, including the likes of applied ethics 
(Leese et al., 2019; van Gorp and van der Molen, 2011), public participation (Chilvers 
and Kearnes, 2020; Lezaun et al., 2017), ELSI/post-ELSI (Balmer et al., 2015; Fisher, 
2005), responsible innovation (Owen et al., 2012, 2013) and technology assessment 
(Hellström, 2003; Rip et al., 1995). A major theme throughout most of them is the aspira-
tion to render interaction between publics, governing authorities, social scientists and 
techno-scientific experts productive in terms of transforming professional practices and 
creating responsiveness to societal values (Fisher et al., 2006; Owen et al., 2012).
Such values usually include social justice, inclusivity and democracy, and are linked 
with issues of power and ethics (Fisher et al., 2015: 43). More often than not, however, 
the values with which technoscience is supposed to correspond are not easily defined, 
and not easily turned into concrete instructions for development or design. Rather, they 
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are in themselves ambiguous and contested, and they need to be filled with meaning in 
specific contexts. Instead of pointing to predefined or generalizable criteria that should 
inform science and technology (and thereby raise questions of who should be entitled to 
define and impose such criteria), the literature on socio-technical collaboration tends to 
point to reflexivity, exchange and shared responsibilities as intrinsic values that become 
enacted through close cooperation between the social sciences and the natural and engi-
neering sciences (Balmer et al., 2015; Chilvers, 2012). In the best case scenario, socio-
technical collaboration would then lead to more socially responsible orderings of 
knowledge and society. In the words of Balmer et al. (2015: 8), ‘the hope for such pro-
jects is that “working with” scientists and getting further entangled could help to produce 
novel and more diverse forms of objects and knowledge for all participants’.
We share these hopes. We do, however, contend that the conditions under which socio-
technical collaborations are possible change when security is introduced as a contextual 
backdrop. Security is an essentially contested concept (Balzacq, 2015; Gallie, 1955). 
Moreover, as Anderson (2010) suggests, it should not be understood as a condition, but 
rather as a process that presupposes the continuous production of intelligence, anticipa-
tion of threat, and concomitant political and practical action. This process is coined by the 
definition threats (the security problems that are perceived as pressing), reference objects 
(the lives, material goods, communities or values that are to be protected), as well as the 
means that are considered adequate for its production (Buzan et al., 1998; Huysmans, 
1998; Krause and Williams, 1997). The meaning of security changes in accordance with 
what or who is considered a threat at a particular point in time, as well as in accordance 
with what or who is supposed to be secured. As such, security has also been deemed a 
‘derivative’ (Booth, 2007) or ‘ambiguous’ (de Lint and Virta, 2004) concept.
All of that said, doing work in the name of security tends to be about orchestrating the 
central mechanisms of power in a society (Huysmans, 1998). This is primarily because 
security discourses, institutions, identities and representations (whether scientific or 
technical) tend to be used to solidify understandings about fundamental aspects of soci-
ety. Understood as processes of social ordering, they form the boundary work between 
normal and exceptional political states. Security, in other words, is not just about the 
protection of basic components of society; on the contrary, the term often arises as a way 
to justify violence, oppression and the maintenance of power in the hands of a few 
(Visvanathan and Setelvad, 2014). Through the past half-century, security logics have 
colonized many regulatory domains besides the traditional ones of the nation-state and 
the military, including migration, public health and the environment (Buzan and Hansen, 
2009), thus extending questions of social ordering throughout many registers of society.
This has become problematic, as policy-makers, practitioners and the technical aca-
demic disciplines often demonstrate a tendency to bracket the social constructedness 
and ambiguity of security, itself a move designed to use a sense of objectivity about the 
concept to do political work (cf. Anderson, 2006). Security issues are instead per-
ceived and presented as taken-for-granted problems that could, notably with the help 
of technoscientific tools, be resolved in a straightforward fashion. Science and tech-
nology, in this perspective, are reduced to vicarious agents that serve to realize a politi-
cal agenda and are productive of power in the name of security (Bigo et al., 2014; 
Davidshofer et al., 2017). Critical security scholars have pushed back on this 
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characterization, and have pointed to the exclusionary, undemocratic and/or illiberal 
effects that technoscientific security tools can produce throughout various domains 
such as border control (Dijstelbloem and Meijer, 2011), risk analysis (Leese, 2014), 
biometric identity management (Epstein, 2007) and automated behavioral analytics in 
surveillance footage (Matzner, 2016).
To counter the colonizing tendencies of security, and to address concrete problems of 
‘too much’ or problematic securing practices, significant work has been done on the 
notion of desecuritization. Rather than defining and dealing with threats in an exception-
alist fashion, scholars have suggested that security issues should be dealt with in the 
same ways as ‘normal’, non-security political issues. In doing so, security politics could 
be brought into standard democratic policy-making processes that entail careful delib-
eration, transparency and accountability (Aradau, 2004; Hansen, 2012). At the same 
time, Huysmans (2011) has pointed out how mundane, everyday practices of data pro-
duction and processing, while in themselves not spectacular or even noteworthy, can 
become important sources for security operations (see also Woolgar and Neyland, 2013). 
Calling them ‘little security nothings’, Huysmans points to how security practices at 
times tend to fly beneath the radar of public attention. Both perspectives highlight the 
need for scholarly engagement with security in order to understand how it comes into 
being and how it can be challenged or contained.
In summary, STS takes the ontological multiplicity of science and technology as its 
starting point, and critical security studies does the same with the ontological multiplicity 
of security. There is a need to problematize what security is and what it does, how (in-)
security is framed as a political problem, how security is productive of power relations, 
and how security policies and security practices unfold normative repercussions. 
Combining STS and critical security studies puts our focus on technoscientific security 
assemblages, i.e. those processes and tools that turn sociotechnical imaginaries (Jasanoff 
and Kim, 2015) into ordering practices. Like the turn towards engagement in STS, a 
‘critical’ attitude towards security, for many scholars, presupposes scholarly interven-
tions to address violence, discrimination, and social injustice, and to exercise a form of 
advocacy on behalf of those who are negatively affected by security policies and prac-
tices. In light of the potentially negative ramifications of security, scholars have however 
been cautious in how they approach collaboration. Entering technoscientific security 
contexts presents an opportunity to apply principles of socio-technical collaboration to 
security practices, but it comes with a set of normative challenges, to which we now turn.
Boundary work in socio-technical collaborations
Collaboration presupposes proximity, and there are long-standing concerns within STS 
and critical security studies about such proximity (Price, 2011). Many of these concerns 
center on questions of the proper role or researchers and their relationships to the sites 
and communities they study, thus doing boundary work of academic research. Critical 
security studies scholars tend to be more attuned to these concerns than many in STS, 
who, particularly recently, are more concerned with pushing the boundaries of how to 
have STS concepts travel across contexts (Downey and Zuiderent-Jerak, 2017). Coleman 
and Hughes (2015: 145) have, for example, pointed to the need to ‘step back from and 
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problematize security.’ For them, critical distance is paramount for scholars in order to 
maintain a space for reflexivity that does not become colonized by security logics, the 
professional habitus of practitioners, or political discourses.
Such considerations echo concerns that have been put forward in the literature on 
socio-technical collaboration as well. As Nordmann and Schwarz (2010) have argued, it 
might at times be hard to resist the seductive ‘lure of the “yes”’ in technoscience, as it 
presents presumably elegant and straightforward forms of addressing social problems. 
Such seduction becomes aggravated by the (institutionalized) positionality of the social 
sciences within technoscientific contexts, the shared forms of responsibility, and the 
dependencies that result from close entanglements (Leese et al., 2019). STS techniques 
of attuning exactly to those claims of the supposed elegance of technical solutions can 
help those with a stronger background in critical security studies navigate these issues of 
proximity and openness.
With regard to security communities of practice, the risk of co-option (Mosse, 2006) 
does not merely come in the form of the seduction of science and technology, but also in 
the form of larger political agendas. Collaboration with the intention of infusing the pro-
duction of technoscientific security tools with reflexivity, shared responsibilities and 
democratic oversight can end up inadvertently legitimizing undesired political programs. 
This has been illustrated in the case of peace research. Researchers who, in order to 
address the roots of political violence, choose to engage with policy-makers and to con-
tribute to international interventions and peace-making processes, have at times found 
that their knowledge about conflict structures may have been used to reinforce existing 
power structures rather than to tackle the root causes of conflict (Hynek and Chandler, 
2013). This example demonstrates how collaboration can be turned into a fig leaf that 
conceals structural questions of power and politics while at the same time resorting to the 
pretense of academic impartiality and analytical rigor.
Finally, similar arguments have also been put forward with regard to the reproduction 
of dominant discourses. Close proximity to security communities of practice will almost 
by default result in a deep immersion into professional cultures, rationales and processes 
of meaning-making. While this is generally desirable in order to foster mutual dialogue, 
scholars have pointed to the danger of embracing and reinforcing particular framings and 
discourses in collaboration and academic analyses (Rappert, 2009). This is particularly 
pertinent against the backdrop of the social constructedness of threats and reference 
objects, and the tools that would allegedly be needed to get the job done. Huysmans 
(2002) has cautioned that social scientific work, even with a clear critical edge, can con-
tribute to the entrenchment of certain threat imaginaries or terminologies (e.g. migration 
as a security risk, or the use of ‘border management’ as a euphemism for highly exclu-
sionary security practices at border crossing points).
Security, we argue, creates a number of complications for forms of socio-technical 
collaboration. Some have argued that, in the light of potential co-option and reproduction 
of dominant narratives, there should not be any socio-technical security collaborations at 
all (Neocleous, 2018). Others have been more optimistic, although aware of the chal-
lenges (Austin, 2019; Burgess, 2018; Leese et al., 2019). Building on these works, we 
propose to pursue collaboration with security communities of practice, but to proceed 
with caution. Following Jasanoff (1996), there can be no such thing as impartiality or 
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a-politicality in research. It is then all the more important to actively shape research 
along the lines of reflexivity, shared responsibilities, dialogue, public involvement and 
democratic procedures.
In the following, we trace how forms of critical socio-technical collaboration could 
play out in practice. We draw on three vignettes from our previous and ongoing work. 
Each vignette exemplifies a different type of socio-technical collaboration defined by 
different positionalities and modes of engagement. For each case, we briefly introduce 
the specific empirical context and then focus on five aspects of our collaborations with 
security communities of practice: (1) The form of intervention, that is, the relational 
configuration between the researcher and the relevant community of practice. (2) The 
intended goal, that is, the normative orientation of our engagement. (3) The mode in 
which the collaboration took place and the explanations of the methodological means we 
chose for the engagement. (4) The challenges that appeared during our collaborations 
and how we coped with them, with what success, and how we critically reflect on this 
experience. Finally, each vignette will describe (5) the impact of the engagement, espe-
cially in comparison with the intended aims.
Vignette 1: An outside commentary on information 
warfare
What kind of security concern is the spread of disinformation? Many politicians, journal-
ists, think-tanks, security experts and academics in the Czech Republic believe that 
information chaos and the spread of disinformation is not only a political challenge, but 
also a symptom of being in a new type of information warfare or hybrid warfare with 
Russia (Eberle and Daniel, 2019). Since the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, pre-
viously overlooked conspiracy websites publishing news of dubious quality and pro-
Russian propaganda started to be perceived as an extended arm of Russian government 
seeking to destabilize Western liberal democracies. This concern even translated into an 
update of the Czech National Security Strategy, in which the spread of disinformation 
and propaganda were labelled as security issues threatening the cooperative security 
mechanism in the West (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015). Against the backdrop of this 
narrative on ‘Russian-led information warfare’, disputes over the factual accuracy of 
news started to be framed by security experts and politicians as an existential clash 
between active opponents of Russian aggression on the one hand and supporters of 
Putin’s regime on the other (Daniel and Eberle, 2018).
In response to the escalating rhetoric related to this issue, one of us (Rychnovská) co-
authored an academic article analyzing how this novel problematization of security (i.e. 
framing information disorder as information warfare or hybrid warfare) affects the poli-
tics of security expertise (Rychnovská and Kohút, 2018), and briefly after that a newspa-
per commentary that criticized the militarization of the public discourse (Rychnovská 
and Smetana, 2019). Both pieces were written from the perspective of academic research-
ers contributing to the national debate, without any prior experience of engaging in these 
specific issues or the community of practice.
The aim of the engagement was two-fold. Analytically, Rychnovská and her collabo-
rators sought to map the newly emerged national network of actors recognized as experts 
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on information warfare and scrutinize what policies they suggested as a response to the 
spread of disinformation, and what type of knowledge and expertise they mobilized in 
this regard. This was in line with analyses focused on the role that STS researchers might 
take in addressing public reason in a ‘post-truth’ age (Jasanoff and Simmet, 2017). 
Normatively, the academic paper aimed at destabilizing the taken-for-grantedness of a 
specific assemblage of actors, practices and narratives making possible the rise of infor-
mation warfare as a dominant security frame in the national debate.
In the escalating expert rhetoric on information warfare, the media engagement piece 
went further, as its aim was to desecuritize the highly polarized, and presumably milita-
rized, public debate by moving the issue out of the sphere of exceptional politics and to 
stress the possibility of political choice, not ‘necessity’, on how to deal with disinforma-
tion. In this context, the securitized debate suggested that Russia waged a (hybrid) war 
against the West and that the West needed to start defending itself. As such, we, the 
protagonists of the critical engagement, came to the public debate with alternative values 
and capacities than the community of practice (see Fisher et al., 2015) and concretely, 
with the goal to change the narrative.
The academic article (Rychnovská and Kohút, 2018) used social network analysis to 
visualize the public performance of ‘information warfare expertise’, that is, who was 
able to achieve public legitimacy to speak about what and how information warfare was 
ongoing. The newspaper commentary, on the other hand, looked critically at the public 
debate on disinformation. Specifically, it claimed that the debate overlooked the ongoing 
sociotechnical transformations shaping the production and consumption of news and 
pointed out that the framing of the debate as warfare only deepened societal polarization, 
breed mistrust in political elites, contribute to the further propagation of conspiracy theo-
ries, and may ultimately lead to the destruction of free democratic debate. For instance, 
it rejected the ranking of Czech media based on the level of their alleged pro-Russian 
orientation, created by an influential conservative think-tank, as well as calls for the 
suspension of certain rights in the fight against online propaganda, and argued that fact-
checking alone would not solve the spread of disinformation. Instead, the article sug-
gested that what was at stake better understood as a structural problem of information 
disorder, characteristic of occasional Russian involvement, and highlighted the impor-
tance of understanding the social demand for anti-elitist and anti-system interpretations 
of political affairs in the first place.
The intervention was taken from the position of outside commentators, offering criti-
cal reflection based on academic expertise and taking the risk of presenting an unpopular 
opinion, while questioning some of the largely undisputed truths in the dominant for-
eign-policy and national identity narrative. Not surprisingly, the engagement triggered a 
heated reaction in diplomatic and expert communities and in the public debate, and its 
protagonists (including Rychnovská) were accused of academic isolation, of misunder-
standing the ‘real’ security threats and the sheer size of Russian involvement in the West, 
and even of co-option by the pro-Russian forces undermining Western liberal democ-
racy. The commentary was first rejected by a major liberal newspaper, whose editor 
argued in email correspondence that ‘the commentary underestimates the threat … that 
Russia is waging an information WARFARE against the West’ (translated from Czech, 
capitalization in original), while suggesting that writing such a commentary was an act 
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of naivety and foolishness. It was later published by a minor left progressive online 
magazine and was instantly widely circulated on social media and commented on by key 
Czech journalists, experts and publicly known military figures. They shared a very criti-
cal view of the article, expressed shock that a young generation of Czech academics took 
a supposedly pro-Russian stance, and some of them referred to writing the commentary 
as an act of ‘useful idiots’, allegedly sponsored by Russia or China.
The academic article (Rychnovská and Kohút, 2018) triggered similar reactions when 
it was published. Some contested the value of academic research that not only lacks clear 
policy solutions, but also goes against the dominant foreign policy and security orienta-
tion of the country. For instance, in reaction to the visualized network of information war 
experts, a top-level Czech diplomat argued that ‘a similar mapping might be of interest 
to the Russian intelligence’ and suggested that such research is harmful to Czech national 
security (Kurfürst, 2019). The negative response to the engagement confirmed the inher-
ently political nature of expertise and the dynamic interplay between scientific facts, 
values, and emotions (Durnová, 2019). In this case, this was made visible when aca-
demic arguments were contested for not confirming the mainstream political discourse 
and allegedly undermining national security.
In order to lower the risk of positioning researchers as moral judges and to work towards 
some collaborative reflexivity with the community of practice (cf. Balmer et al., 2015: 20), 
a public seminar was organized in which the arguments were presented to interested pub-
lics, consisting mostly of foreign diplomats, security professionals, and journalists. Opening 
space for critical reflection enabled the authors to discuss what Balmer et al. (2015: 20) call 
‘unshared goals’ with communities of practice. Despite disagreement on short-term meas-
ures, Rychnovská and her co-authors were able to generate shared understanding with oth-
ers at the seminar that a stable, prosperous society based on positive values would be best 
equipped to deal with disinformation and external propaganda.
How do we assess the impact of navigating (out of) the identity of a ‘useful idiot’? 
Both interventions were met with much criticism and suspicion from a large part of the 
relevant community of practice, the network of experts shaping the discourse on disin-
formation and information warfare in the Czech Republic. Despite this, two positive 
effects can be highlighted. First, the engagement helped disrupt the binary of the public 
debate on disinformation and opened a space for more complex understanding of the 
problem, which soon started to be filled by other expert voices criticizing the dominant 
narrative on Russian hybrid warfare (e.g. Deník, 2019; Syrovátka, 2019). Eventually, 
some ideas from the initial critical piece spread to broader media and expert discourse 
and helped disrupt the original polarized black-and-white reading of the issue. It also 
gave vocabulary to people who felt a certain unease with the military language and the 
logic of urgency and exceptionality surrounding the issue of fighting disinformation, a 
role that Downey and Zuiderent-Jerak (2017: 234) call ‘meta-activism’. Drawing on rich 
conceptual vocabulary of critical security studies and STS, the main protagonists were 
able to translate these concepts into vocabulary understandable to a broader – albeit still 
rather limited – audience and offer different lenses through which to understand social 
and political phenomena.
Going after the dissenting voice on scientific and security matters, particularly on 
politically charged topics, is a common tactic, and we are not the first STS and science 
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policy researchers who have found themselves to be the target of the status quo. In the 
world of climate science, Roger Pielke Jr., Judith Curry, and others were the subject of 
what could be reasonably called a political witch hunt in the mid-2010s for noting the 
complexity of associating specific disasters to anthropogenic climate change and point-
ing out the limits of climate models (Curry, 2015; Pielke Jr., 2015; Tangney, 2019). As 
Pielke (2015) explained, he tried to correct specific parts of the climate change narrative 
and point out unsubstantiated causal claims made in it, yet was labelled as a climate 
sceptic instead, was subjected to a congressional testimony, significant public and scien-
tific backlash, and ended up largely exiting the climate science debate.
We found ourselves in a similar position, and are also on the cusp of deciding whether 
to exit the disinformation debate altogether. There is another approach, however, that we, 
or those who come after us, might pursue next. The issue of disinformation in the Czech 
Republic is being presented within a security framing as a conventional national security 
problem that can be ‘solved’. This is very much how climate change is often character-
ized. As Pielke and others have argued within climate science (Prins et al., 2010), the 
first step to dealing with disinformation may be to recognize the complexity and ‘wick-
edness’ of the problem (Rittel and Webber, 1973). Their recommendation was to take 
policy advice from the famed English landscape gardener Lancelot ‘Capability’ Brown: 
‘lose the object and draw nigh obliquely’ (Prins et al., 2010; Prins and Rayner, 2007).1 In 
other words, unpack the multiple layers and dimensions of the ‘problem’ and address 
them separately, with different types of urgency, expertise, and in a different mode of 
knowledge production. We could consider a security framing for disinformation, but it 
will take many policy areas acting from many angles on the question of what counts as 
legitimate knowledge to actually make movement on the security aspects of the problem. 
Only then might we be pleasantly surprised to find ourselves delivered into a society that 
has a sustainable information environment.
Vignette 2: Ethnographic research on predictive policing
The second vignette foregrounds a quite different mode of socio-technical collaboration. 
It highlights how unplanned critical engagement can emerge through field research 
encounters with security professionals. It illustrates how close proximity to a security 
community of practice turned from a concern into an asset, as a window of opportunity 
for engagement opened up through close proximity to key actors in the field. Expertise 
and trust could in this case be leveraged as a means of lending credibility to critical 
voices within a techno-scientific security context.
One of us (Leese) was recently involved in a multi-year research project on predictive 
policing in Germany and Switzerland. Predictive policing tools are supposed to provide 
police departments with the possibility of algorithmically analyzing crime data to produce 
actionable estimates about crime risk. The police could then devise suitable prevention 
strategies to discourage or deter criminal activity within these spatio-temporal risk coordi-
nates (Perry et al., 2013). The project was carried out in cooperation with one other aca-
demic researcher, and its aim was – through in-depth expert interviews with involved 
actors as well as participant observation of predictive policing practices – to reconstruct 
predictive policing as the formation of a sociotechnical system of knowledge construction 
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and ordering practices (Egbert and Leese, 2020). The research was not originally con-
ceived as a form of socio-technical collaboration, and the research design was not set up in 
a way that would have facilitated ways to go beyond the traditional divide between 
researchers and research subjects.
The plan was to explore how algorithmic crime predictions would transform the ways 
in which society is policed. It was informed by a presupposition that predictive policing 
would turn out to be an inherently problematic techno-scientific security practice. 
Fostered by media reports (Stanley, 2014), NGO’s civil rights analyses (Knobloch, 2018; 
Robinson and Koepke, 2016), as well as critical academic works (Andrejevic, 2017; 
Mantello, 2016), we expected that algorithmic forms of crime analysis and ensuing 
police tactics would produce or aggravate issues of profiling and discrimination, engen-
der forms of over-/underpolicing, and reinforce feedback loops between reported/
detected criminal activity and the databases for the production of crime risk estimates. 
These concerns were not completely off, as our research revealed that there are some 
worrying issues and tendencies in how the police aspire to mobilize techno-scientific 
tools for the production of knowledge and order.
For us, these assumptions meant that we would need to keep a certain distance from the 
police professionals that we studied, from their ways of thinking about crime and security, 
from their occupational cultures, and not least from the predictive policing software that 
was supposed to provide them with new forms of knowledge and power. After all, we 
wanted to make sure that even after prolonged phases of field research, we would still be 
able to criticize predictive policing and point out its shortcomings in terms of non-dis-
crimination, social justice, and other issues that we had not anticipated. However, as we 
followed police departments through their experimentation with, and implementation of 
S predictive policing software, we witnessed both their grappling with technical and 
organizational aspects of technology implementation, and their struggling with legal, ethi-
cal and wider societal implications of algorithmic knowledge production. These struggles 
were particularly visible as they worked through the automation of tasks and processes 
that used to be carried out by human analysts, resulting in new constellations between 
human analysts and predictive policing software. To a certain degree, institutional efforts 
to stay in control of a new techno-scientific tool were to be expected from a public agency. 
Police departments aspired to understand the theories, models, data sources, and algo-
rithms that constitute predictive policing software, and to implement it in ways that it 
would not undercut human decision-making and obscure institutional accountability.
It was, however, surprising how openly the police communicated their struggles and 
concerns to us, and even more surprising that they actively turned to us for advice on 
several occasions. One of us was, for example, invited to present findings from our ongo-
ing research to senior police officers and senior analysts at a police department that had 
not yet implemented predictive policing software, but was considering doing so. What 
started as a formal presentation turned into a three-hour conversation during which the 
involved police officials were primarily interested in societal and normative questions 
around algorithmic modes of crime analysis. Rather than shutting down or dispelling criti-
cal findings, they very much encouraged arguments about potentially problematic secu-
rity practices resulting from the use of algorithmic crime analysis software. In a similar 
vein, one of us was recently invited to contribute to the development of the German 
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national artificial intelligence strategy for policing, particularly with regard to the ethical 
aspects of techno-scientific knowledge tools. In fact, we found ourselves in a situation 
similar to Brian Rappert when he was researching biosecurity codes of conduct, where the 
‘roles of ‘questioner’, ‘responder’ and ‘expert’ [shifted] quite unexpectedly during social 
interactions’ (Rappert 2009, 166).
Security institutions are not known for such openness. On the contrary, they usually 
present themselves as hard to access, shrouded by a veil of secrecy, and quite reserved 
when it comes to talking about their tools and practices (de Goede et al., 2019; Monahan 
and Fisher, 2015). Why were police departments during our research so willing to openly 
communicate and, more importantly, to listen to critical perspectives on predictive polic-
ing? A few factors may have contributed. First, during the period of our research, predic-
tive policing technology was still in its infancy and there was little certainty around the 
specific software packages, the theories, the models, and the data that could and/or 
should be used for crime forecasts. Police departments set up predictive policing as 
‘experiments’, ‘field tests’ or ‘trials’ during which they sought to figure out how to best 
implement the production of algorithmic crime forecasts, how to translate analytic 
insights into patrol and crime prevention activities, and how to evaluate the efficacy and 
‘success’ of predictive policing methods.
This uncertainty produced a space in which socio-technical collaboration became pos-
sible. The work with social scientists was conceived by some of the involved police 
departments as a welcome opportunity to integrate a different analytical perspective into 
the process. In order to do so, they turned the relationship between researcher and research 
subject upside down, and rendered us interviewees for their own questions. In these ques-
tions, the police were not particularly interested in our research insights into the technical 
or organizational aspects of predictive policing. After all, they felt confident that they 
were able to figure those out by themselves. Rather, they were interested in the social sci-
ence perspective, as they were to a lesser extent capable of covering topics such as critical 
perspectives on ethics, privacy and data protection, and social justice.
This was no doubt facilitated by our presence in the field. Having established trust 
through numerous formal and informal encounters, we were readily available as contacts 
who were equipped with the facts about predictive policing, as well as with expertise in 
critical data studies, ethics, and other relevant fields to reflect about possible larger soci-
etal repercussions. Taken together, this constellation opened up what could be considered 
a window of opportunity to gradually reconfigure parts of our research into an unantici-
pated and non-institutionalized form of socio-technical collaboration. An open and criti-
cal form of exchange was facilitated by the police’s institutional need to figure out the 
potential societal repercussions of predictive policing, and to explore possible modes of 
actively intervening and shaping the ordering effects of algorithmic crime forecasts.
Even though there was no initial alignment of goals between the social scientists and 
the police (Balmer et al., 2015: 20), a shared perspective (i.e. a responsible form of pre-
dictive policing) was produced through open discussions about the expectations and con-
cerns vis-à-vis algorithmic knowledge production and subsequent ordering practices. 
Proximity, initially conceived of by the researchers as a risk to be avoided throughout 
fieldwork, eventually lent credibility and opened up a space for reflection about how to 
implement algorithmic crime analysis in a responsive fashion. In structuring future 
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modes of policing, police departments came to appreciate social scientific input into the 
ongoing development and refinement of predictive policing technology. In the end, the 
vignette shows that while assumptions about security spaces as hard to access and obtain 
information might be true, it is nonetheless possible to build critical socio-technical col-
laborations within them.
Vignette 3: Formal involvement in the iGEM competition
Our third vignette provides yet another mode of collaboration. How might we use formal 
involvement in organizations involved in security governance to modify their practices 
and policies in line with STS insights? What are the challenges of such close proximity? 
This vignette addresses these questions through eight years of engagement one of us 
(Evans) has had with iGEM, the international Genetically Engineered Machines compe-
tition. In the past decade, iGEM has developed increasingly sophisticated safety and 
security oversight systems and is now considered an experimental laboratory for security 
governance (McNamara et al., 2014; Millett et al., 2019). I have been a part of discus-
sions about many of the changes that iGEM has undergone in its safety and security 
governance, and have used my position to push for more reflexive capacity in very early 
stage research settings and ambiguous security determination processes.
The process of building the institution of iGEM has also been a process of building 
the field of synthetic biology. This includes the discourses of ‘biology by design’ 
(Smolke, 2009), the identities of the students not as biologists, but as tinkering bioengi-
neers, and the organization of biology in building blocks (biobricks) that can be pieced 
together to create new life with a human-designed purpose (Frow and Calvert, 2013; 
Rabinow and Bennett, 2012). Early on, in the late 2000s, safety and security were under-
stood to be peripheral components of the competition (Guan et al., 2013). Even in 2010, 
when there were 128 teams, there was no systematic screening process in place to under-
stand which genetic sequences teams were using, what they were doing with them, and 
whether that work posed potential harm to them, others, or the environment (McNamara 
2014; McNamara et al., 2014).
Today’s iGEM competition involves over 6000 students in hundreds of teams from 
every continent except Antarctica. As the competition grew, so did arguments from 
biosafety and security professionals that iGEM needed a robust safety and security sys-
tem. These arguments gained traction within iGEM Headquarters after a series of ‘near 
misses’ in the early 2010s, and over the subsequent years iGEM saw the security appara-
tus grow from simple screening just before the competition to a Safety Prize and com-
mercial screening of biological parts (McNamara et al., 2014, 984) to a requirement that 
teams check in with the Safety and Security committee multiple times over the course of 
the year, or face automatic disqualification from the competition. No other aspect of 
iGEM has that kind of insight into, and authority over, the teams. iGEM hired the former 
deputy director of the United Nations’ Biological Weapons Convention Implementation 
Support Unit, Piers Millett, to be its Vice President for Safety and Security, while all 
other committee heads are volunteers. Each year, iGEM continues to adapt its biosafety 
and biosecurity program (Millett et al., 2019). Clearly, iGEM now takes security and 
safety seriously. But in doing so it is widely seen to be enabling, rather than constraining, 
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the economic, academic curiosity, and other aspects of the competition. This is in no 
small part due to the birth of the safety and security program inside the Human Practices 
Committee, and the engagement of the program with a range of critical scholars.
Several institutional characteristics of iGEM have made it amenable to critical 
engagement. First, as a professionally-led student competition, the stakes for making 
changes to the structure of the institution are significantly lower than are similar changes 
made at, say, a university or a government body. Second, the yearly nature of iGEM 
provides an in-built iteration cycle for experimenting on governance structures. Third, 
iGEM is a small organization ‘on the books’, with around a dozen staff, but it has a mas-
sive volunteer community: ozens of professionals sit on its committees pro bono; all of 
the teams have to pay to compete and provide their own funding to attend the annual 
Giant Jamboree in Boston; and nearly 200 professionals also pay their own way to 
Boston to judge the four-day competition. This structure has flourished due to a certain 
laissez-faire approach from the management, where the Committees in particular are 
given significant autonomy to innovate on how iGEM as an institution addresses local 
concerns, from measurement to ‘human practices’ to security.
I became engaged in iGEM in 2012 as a judge, and later as part of the organization 
through my roles as a member of the Safety and Security Committee and a member and 
then Co-Chair of the Human Practices Committee. While my expertise was on security 
issues as well as STS, I initially chose to join the Human Practices Committee, which 
was focused on the ways to get teams working on the social, political, economic, and 
other ways of understanding synthetic biology and its possible roles in the world. This 
was a purposeful move, as I believed that getting students to think about security issues 
was really only one example of getting them most of whom were being trained in tradi-
tional scientific departments that had yet to integrate any insights from STS to think 
about anything ‘beyond the bench’. I joined the Safety and Security Committee to stay 
abreast of the security developments in the field, and discovered an opportunity to modu-
late (Fisher et al., 2006) the connections between safety, security and the concerns of the 
Human Practice Committee.
Having myself, the Director of Human Practices Megan Palmer, and other members 
of the Human Practices Committee sit on the Safety and Security Committee has allowed 
us to pick up not only potential safety and security issues, but also opportunities to have 
conversations with teams about how things that look like just a safety concern (say, envi-
ronmental containment of a project) may also have significant issues around indigenous 
rights (the release of organisms on native lands), politics (transboundary transfer of spec-
imens) and the structure of science (a belief that isolation of variables is the most desir-
able way to conduct investigations) (Evans and Frow, 2015).
The engagement work, therefore, has had two main goals, the first of which is making 
sure the teams are conducting their work safely and that known or novel security con-
cerns are addressed early in the teams’ work. While most teams are undergraduates, they 
routinely take up techniques invented only a few years earlier, and therefore they are 
likely to test existing regulatory and oversight capabilities – including on security issues 
– of their home institutions and countries. As a result, the Safety and Security Committee 
often finds itself at the vanguard of novel security issues in the field, and is able to 
experiment with novel ways of addressing those issues. As an example, two years after 
Evans et al. 203
an early publication on the possibility of producing a ‘gene drive’ capable of altering 
entire wild populations of organisms (Esvelt et al., 2014), one iGEM team from Minnesota 
tried to build a gene drive for their project (iGEM, 2016). This was the subject of much 
discussion within the Safety and Security Committee during the iGEM Giant Jamboree.
After that year’s competition, I worked with Piers Millett to produce the first draft 
of iGEM’s policy on gene drives, which was the first such policy developed in the 
world. We happened to both be at the University of Cambridge for a conference on 
catastrophic risk, and we drafted the policy between his presentation and mine; I then 
presented it as part of my talk on ‘Words of caution in making objects of security con-
cern’. A key component in the drafting was trying to balance the safety and security 
concerns with the desire for iGEM to remain a place that fostered, rather than seques-
tered, student excitement about synthetic biology. That draft then went back to the 
Safety and Security Committee for further revision and was finalized by February 
2017 (iGEM, 2017). Was the gene drive system that the Minnesota team tried to build 
even completed, and in either case, a security concern? The ambiguous answers to 
these questions within iGEM actually became a resource for fostering proactive 
engagement with potential security issues, to keep security from becoming a dominant 
frame for future projects. That is, the gene drive policy that was developed speaks as 
much to the need to reinscribe the values of the community as it does to the need to 
ensure oversight of potentially harmful research.
The second goal of engagement has been that I and the others on the Human Practices 
Committee never wanted safety and security to be the only way that teams think beyond 
the bench, and it has only been through our active engagement with the institutional 
structure of iGEM and experimenting year-on-year on how to shape that institution to be 
more open to STS, ethics, and other broader aspects of the research that change has 
occurred. This has involved many meetings with iGEM Headquarters (the permanent 
staff) on the nature of the competition, what counts as things ‘going wrong’, and how to 
mitigate those concerns while also reinscribing the values that iGEM espouses (iGEM, 
2014). Of course, in doing so, I have several times had heated debates on what those 
values should be, and how they should be balanced in practice, encountering the ‘deeply 
entrenched pervasive assumptions, framings, and narratives about … the supposed sepa-
ration between science and society’ (Marris and Calvert, 2020: 34–35). These moments 
are ones of reflection for me on the value of remaining involved in iGEM at all, if I am 
actually doing more to reinscribe the very narratives I am seeking to question.
Reflecting on this experience, I was concerned when safety and security moved into 
center stage in the organization. This included Millett becoming Vice President of Safety 
and Security (a title held by none of the other Committee chairs), and the lack of safety/
security compliance becoming one of the few means to disqualify teams. The Safety 
Check-in forms also became iGEM team’s primary reporting mechanism, and thus an 
organizational sight line for iGEM headquarters (cf. Scott, 1998). That concern was 
assuaged, however, through the relationships between the Committees, through iGEM 
headquarters’ continuing to be open to supporting Committee-led initiatives to use these 
opportunities to create more open channels for broader concerns to bubble up, and 
through the commitment of iGEM to ensuring that safety and security oversight enable 
team learning and exploration, not constrain it.
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Towards critical collaboration
Critical security studies have pointed to how security is framed as a special type of poli-
tics, and that engagement with security brings additional challenges, as it is often a mat-
ter of sidetrack deliberation among closed circles of experts (Bigo, 2014), clouded either 
by secrecy (Masco 2018; Rappert, 2009) or by the proprietary characteristics of the tech-
noscientific tools that are mobilized in its production (de Goede et al., 2019). Such traits 
are in many respects similar in the workings of science and technology. Combined with 
security they become amplified and tend to build multiple barriers of access not only to 
decision-making on techno-security at the political level, but also to the legitimate per-
formance of expertise. If STS turned to science to address the hard case of the construc-
tion of a ‘natural reality’, the turn we are making to security is to address the hard case 
of the construction of ‘political reality’ – recognizing, of course, that the social and the 
natural are co-produced (Jasanoff, 2004). Both provide similar claims to be able to speak 
for the way the world really is, and through that, what ought to be done.
There are many spaces, however, that are not fully securitized or linked with national 
security where security framings also gain momentum. These ‘edges of security’ deserve 
as much attention as traditional security domains. They also may be easier to access and 
engage, as there are de facto already competing framings to security in these cases. STS 
scholars might consider the relationship between science, technology and security to be 
a mysterious and inaccessible sphere, but it need not be. Based on our experiences 
described in the vignettes, we argue against the myth of security as a special space that 
cannot be entered and shaped by a critical researcher working towards the democratiza-
tion of science, technology and politics. Instead, we encourage critical researchers to find 
their way to the communities of security practice and to take on responsibility for the 
practice of security in the given area.
Our three vignettes provide illustrations of possible modes of critical collaboration 
with security communities of practice. Table 1 shows an overview of the challenges we 
encountered and the strategies we applied to tackle these challenges. The shared chal-
lenge that we all faced was how to move towards more awareness and critical reflection 
in the relevant community, while at the same time balancing security concerns with other 
values relevant for the community or society more broadly.
The first point to note is that the vignettes illustrate the dilemma of engagement. 
Rychnovská describes the risk of too much distance to the community of practice and the 
related accusation of co-option by the ‘enemy’. Her experience shows that transparency 
about the goals of engagement and openness regarding the strengths and limits of one’s 
engagement can help mitigate this critique, though never fully. Leese and Evans, in con-
trast, were concerned with the risks and opportunities resulting from close proximity. 
Close proximity, for them, provided an opportunity to better understand the practices of 
security knowledge production and the empirical context, but as each case shows, prox-
imity could also lead to a role in shaping these practices and thus be a part of the produc-
tion of (in)security.
In reflecting on the strategies used for dealing with these challenges in our research, all 
vignettes highlight the importance, as well as limitations, of opening spaces for dialogue, 
and show diverse ways to bridge the spheres of social scientific and practical expertise and 
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create platforms for deliberation between diverse actors. Rychnovská stresses the role of 
developing a conceptual vocabulary to make the critique of dominant security narratives 
understandable for broader audiences and the importance of being prepared to take the risk 
of espousing an unpopular opinion. Leese and Evans both explain how they eventually 
became engaged in shaping the practices of security expertise and thus took on responsibil-
ity for the practice of security in the relevant area. As such, we used our proximity to create 
a sense of shared responsibility, to open up spaces for dialogue, and to practice collabora-
tive reflexivity and collective experimentation (Balmer et al., 2015).
Throughout the vignettes, we have shown how participation and socio-technical col-
laboration became subject to reimagining and remaking – and ultimately subject of 
ongoing experimentation and collaborative reflexivity. This is in line with the post-ELSI 
turn in STS (Balmer et al., 2015; Chilvers, 2012). In all cases, the relations to the com-
munity of practice and the goals of our contribution were dynamically shaped in the 
process of engagement, which highlights the importance of reflecting on the construction 
and negotiation of roles of social scientists involved in socio-technical collaborations (cf. 
Balmer et al., 2015). Like Chilvers and Kearnes (2020), we believe that diverse, emer-
gent, and co-productionist approaches to socio-technical collaborations foster deeper 
critical, yet still constructive, engagement with science and technology.
Collective experimentation and reflexivity, together with the willingness of both par-
ties to open up about their goals and take risks, encourage both social scientists and 
security communities of practice to engage with each other’s perspectives. Critical col-
laboration can help to explicate concerns about the roles of science and technology in 
security, not only on the side of practitioners who are encouraged to explicate and reflect 
on what they do and why, but also for social scientists who might reconsider and revise 
their (static) positions and knowledge claims vis-à-vis practical contexts (cf. Kurowska 
and Tallis, 2013; Mosse, 2006).
The very possibility of critical collaboration should not be taken for granted, however. 
Being aware of the highly asymmetrical power relations that can structure and define 
Table 1. Challenges and strategies for critical collaboration.
Vignette (mode of 
engagement)
Challenges encountered Strategies devised
Information warfare 
(external commentator)
distance; alleged capture by 
‘the enemy’
transparency about the goals of 




align unshared goals; leverage 
expertise and credibility into 
active involvement in shaping 
of predictive policing
creating a sense of shared 
responsibility; opening spaces 
for dialogue; framing critique in a 
constructive and productive way
iGEM (action research) proximity; co-option; 
reproduction of dominant 
discourses; ambiguity
positioning as internal advisor to 
practitioners who championed 
and rearticulated STS ideas; 
maintained professional critique 
within STS community of 
ongoing engagement
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scholarly engagement with security practitioners is important. As Rychnovská argues in 
her vignette, entering debates in the first place might be difficult – if not impossible – 
especially if there is no dedicated space for collaboration and deliberation. Sometimes, 
as Leese’s vignette shows, such spaces can emerge in an unplanned and unstructured 
fashion, but such opportunities should not be counted on. Conceptually, security tends to 
foreclose open and reflexive debate, as threats are often framed as only understandable 
to domain experts who are in turn considered the only ones entitled to deal with them 
(Bigo, 2002). The prospects of being seen as a legitimate actor with relevant expertise in 
the debate on security might be further complicated by other aspects, such as gender and 
age, which need to be taken into account when reflecting one’s positionality and experi-
ence with engaging the field of practice.
Finally, we must raise the question of whether we could possibly define the success 
(or failure) of critical collaboration. Rather than trying to define measurement criteria 
such as policy-making or behavioral change in organizations, we propose a processual 
understanding of success when it comes to the engagement with security communities of 
practice (Balmer et al., 2015; Leese et al., 2019). We suggest focusing on collaborative 
forms of action, reflection and resulting shared responsibility. These might not always 
take on tangible forms, but they might come in the form of critical reflection among 
security practitioners, greater awareness of the consequences of doing security, or a 
politicization of the ways in which security is discussed and performed in a given con-
text. The creation of a space for discussing alternative framings of the problem (and thus 
potentially desecuritizing the issue) can in and of itself already be considered a positive 
effect of critical engagement, given the initial conditions and the structure of power rela-
tions in which the engagement takes place.
Conclusions
Security is a hard case, as it is concerned with questions of who is allowed to define 
threats to a social order, how, and in what contexts. The workings of security are deeply 
ingrained in the production of knowledge and power. In this capacity, security is charac-
terized by an intimidating aura of gravity that aspires to shut down critical voices. Both 
critical security studies and STS share the ambition to overcome the alleged boundary 
between academia and sites and communities of (in)security production. Critical forms of 
socio-technical collaboration, as we have put forward here, can be seen as viable ways to 
open deliberative and constructive spaces for more inclusive framings of policy problems 
and solutions around the interplays of science, technology, and security. Our vignettes 
show that, although there are different strategies to engage the communities of security 
practice, they share the ambition to shape the discourses, practices and institutions that 
give meaning to what is legitimate and thinkable in a specific techno-security area.
We have, in some respects, come a long way from Bijker’s call in the early 2000s for 
engaging with the communities we research in order to open up the processes through 
which political power is embedded within scientific and technical systems. We now have 
a rapidly developing tradition within STS of ‘making and doing’ through a broad range 
of socio-technical collaborations. We have suggested that the hesitation of STS research-
ers to engage with security is explained in part by concerns of being co-opted into the 
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political. Security, as an area of critical research, might also be avoided because decon-
structing and destabilizing the practices through which our societies seek to protect their 
survival, key values and identities may simply sound too risky and dangerous from a 
normative perspective. We believe the risk of not engaging in this research is greater still, 
precisely because security practices form the basis for institutionalized power structures, 
drawing the lines around who and what is allowed and forbidden.
The vignettes illustrate the fruitfulness that can come from combining critical security 
studies’ analytic capacity for understanding political and organizational work being done 
in the name of security with STS’s current advances in engagement methodology and its 
long-standing skillset in analyzing the social within the technical and scientific. We close 
this article with a call to action. STS scholars (Balmer et al., 2015; Downey and Zuiderent-
Jerak, 2017; Lezaun et al., 2017) as well as critical security studies researchers (Berling 
and Bueger 2017) and social scientists more broadly (Fassin and Harcourt, 2019) can 
take on various roles when engaging with political practice and can experiment with 
numerous models of participation. Engagement with security topics brings additional 
challenges and obstacles, especially for researchers embracing critical approaches to 
dominant discourses and practices of security. That is all the more reason that this is a 
vital and fruitful area of development in theory and practice for STS.
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Note
1. Prins and Rayner (2007: 38) note that the statement, while attributed to Brown’s work, was 
actually coined by William Shenstone: ‘When a building or other object has been once viewed 
from its proper point, the foot should never travel to it by the same path, which the eye has 
travelled over before. Lose the object, and draw nigh, obliquely’ (Shenstone, 1764).
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